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With reference to the class of asset pricing models with a market
maker and mean-variance optimization of speculative agents, the
note seeks to clarify the concepts behind the price adjustment
rule, which are often treated somewhat carelessly in this liter-
ature. Calling attention to the distinction between the agents’
desired holding of the risky asset and the desired change in their
position, the following conclusion is drawn. If market prices are
said to adjust in the direction of excess demand, then the story of
the maximization of expected wealth should be dropped. On the
other hand, the story could be perfectly maintained if the market
maker were assumed to adjust prices inversely to his accumulated
inventory.
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This note is concerned with the interpretation of asset pricing models that,
ﬁrst, employ the ﬁgure of the market maker to adjust market prices and,
second, whose speculative agents are said to be myopic mean-variance op-
timizers of expected wealth or, what amounts to the same, they maximize
a CARA utility function of expected wealth.1 These models are often not
suﬃciently clear about their precise notion of demand and the correspond-
ing changes in the assets the agents are holding. The note makes a few
elementary observations in this respect which, although in one formulation
or another they are possibly common knowledge, are hardly ever made an
explicit subject of discussion.
2. The solution to the mean-variance optimization
The presentation of the mean-variance optimization approach usually begins
with the equation for the wealth dynamics. For concreteness, let the risky
asset be a large stock or market index that pays a dividend yt per share at
the beginning of the market period t, and let the risk-free asset pay a ﬁxed
rate of return r. Then the evolution of the wealth Wh of the agents of type
h from period t to period t+1 is described as
Wh,t+1 = (1+r)Wh,t + [pt+1 + yt+1 − (1+r)pt]zh,t (1)
where in addition pt is the (uniform) price at which the asset is traded in
period t, and zh,t is referred to as “the number of shares of the risky asset
purchased” at time t (emphasis added). The latter quotation can be found
in Hommes et al. (2005, p.1046) or He and Li (2007, p.3400), and there are
several other papers speaking of “purchasing” or “buying”.
More exactly, zh,t is a desired quantity which, however, can always be real-
ized in these models. The optimization problem itself uses (1) as its wealth
constraint, subject to which the expected value of a CARA utility function
U = U(Wh,t+1) = −exp(−αh Wh,t+1) is to be maximized, or in an equivalent
formulation the term Eh,t(Wh,t+1)−(αh/2)Vh,t(Wh,t+1) (where αh > 0 is the
agents’ risk aversion coeﬃcient and Eh,t, Vh,t are their conditional expecta-
1CARA stands for constant absolute risk aversion.
1tions and conditional variance). The explicit solution to this problem is
zh,t =
Eh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1+r)pt]
αh Vh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1+r)pt]
(2)
If one goes back to the derivation of eq.(1), the formulation that zh,t is the
number of shares purchased at time t is found to be somewhat careless. To see
this, let, respectively, Ah,t and Bh,t be the number of shares and the risk-free
asset (bonds, with a price of unity) which are in the portfolio of the agents
of type h at the beginning of period t. At that time the agents have also
received the dividends and interest payments, so their wealth is (dropping
the index h)
Wt = pt At + Bt + yt At + rBt (3)
The agents invest their income on shares and bonds, while for speculative
reasons they may also exchange shares for bonds or vice versa. Denote the
shares and bonds they wish to hold at the beginning of the next period as
Ad
t+1 and Bd
t+1. The shares are bought at the current price pt, taking into





t+1 = Wt (4)
After the new dividends and interest receipts are paid out and the market
price of the shares has changed, the wealth at the beginning of t+1 amounts
to (3) dated one period forward (and Ad, Bd in place of A and B). Using
(4), rearrangement of this equation leads to













t+1) + [pt+1 + yt+1 − (1+r)pt]A
d
t+1 (5)
= (1+r)Wt + [pt+1 + yt+1 − (1+r)pt]A
d
t+1
It follows that zh,t in (1) must be the desired holding of the risky asset. In
contrast to the quotation in connection with (1), what the group of agents
h can be reasonably supposed to “purchase” on the market is not the entire
stock Ad
h,t+1 of the asset that they wish to hold, but just the diﬀerence from
their actual holding Ah,t at the beginning of period t.
23. Price changes in response to excess demand
The issue of the interpretation of zh,t in (2) is more serious than a careless use
of words. To take up what has just been said, we consider it most natural to
reserve the expression ‘excess demand’ for the aggregate diﬀerences between
the agents’ desired and actual holdings, and not for the sum of the desired
holdings themselves. With H groups of speculative agents on the market,










Identifying zh,t with the desired holding Ad
h,t+1 of shares, it could now be
argued that dt is identical to
P
h zh,t if the total number of shares,
P
h Ah,t,
remains constant and is conveniently set equal to zero. This is indeed a
consistent situation in those mean-variance optimization models that employ
a Walrasian auctioneer for continuous market clearing, dt ≡ 0.2 One has
then only to be aware that in a deterministic equilibrium the income from
dividends and interest is exclusively invested in bonds, which implies that
the proportion of wealth held in shares is steadily decreasing. This is the
price one has to pay for a CARA utility function in whose maximization the
level of current wealth is eliminated.
Things are not that simple if market disequilibrium is admitted. A problem
arises in the standard and small-scale models that abstain from rationing
(in a batch auction or through an order book, say) but instead introduce
a market maker, who has two tasks to fulﬁll. He absorbs any excess of
supply from the market and serves any excess of demand from his inventory,
and at the beginning of every period he quotes a new price. Regarding the
latter task, the market maker is usually characterized as adjusting the price
in the direction of the speculative traders’ excess demand. With a positive
adjustment coeﬃcient µd, this reads,











2It might, however, happen that some agents hold short positions in terms of both the
risky asset and bonds. If this were to be ruled out with certainty, a constraint would have
to be introduced that requires the model to keep track of Ah,t and even Bh,t; cf. Bottazzi
et al. (2005, pp.208f).
3This formulation may be contrasted with the rule as it is written in the
models with optimizing agents and a market maker (for example, the models
in the two papers from which the quotation on the term zh,t in eq.(1) was
taken):




Similar to the Walrasian framework, eq.(7) would be equivalent to (8) if
PH
h=1 Ah,t were to vanish. In the present context, however, it has to be taken
into account that the assumption there employed, according to which the
total number of shares is ﬁxed, now also has to include the inventory Am,t
of the market maker. In explicit terms, if Ah,t and Am,t are conceived of as
deviations from some target levels,
H X
h=1
Ah,t + Am,t = 0 (9)
Owing to the ﬁrst task of the market maker, which is to buﬀer the aggre-
gate excess demand, Am,t is obviously ﬂuctuating over time in this identity.
Therefore, in a market maker setting, the sum
PH
h=1 Ah,t in (7) cannot be
treated as a constant. In other words, equations (7) and (8) are distinct
and a claim that zh,t in (2) represents the agents’ excess demand would be
unwarrantable.
Equation (8) could be maintained as it is, with zh,t determined by (2), if
this term is reinterpreted as the agents’ desired change in their position.
Clearly, (2) can then no longer be sold as the solution to the maximization
of expected wealth. Nevertheless, a loss of the optimization ﬂavour need
not be too deeply regretted since the right-hand side of (2) makes perfect
economic sense. It says, after all, that excess demand is proportional to
the expected excess return on the asset and discounted by some measure of
risk or volatility. Alternatively, (8) can be preserved if one ﬁnds another
optimization problem that determines the desired change in the position and
just yields (2) as its solution. In any case, the positions of the agents are here
a mere appendix to the system, so there is no feedback that (in an otherwise
stable stochastic setting) would prevent them from diverging.
Of course, speculative dynamics can also be built on the basis of eq.(7) with
its position-based strategies Ad
h,t+1 = zh,t from (2). This, however, leads to
4a type of model where Ad
h,t+1 as well as Ad
h,t = Ah,t enter the price adjust-
ment equation, which is more complicated and sets up a completely diﬀerent
framework from the one established by equations (2) and (8). In compensa-
tion for that, boundedness of the price guarantees boundedness of the agents’
positions.3
4. An alternative price adjustment rule of the market maker
There is still another option to justify adherence to equations (2) and (8),
namely, to drop eq.(7). This means the price adjustments must be supposed
to follow a diﬀerent principle from excess demand.
If one thinks of the accumulation of the market maker’s inventory, it is only
natural to consider the possibility that he will not remain completely passive
in this respect. A minimal and straightforward idea has been proposed by
Farmer (2001, p.66), according to which a negative (positive) position that
has been accumulated prompts the market maker to encourage selling (buy-
ing) by raising (lowering) the price more than usual. Let us here consider
the case that fully concentrates on this new principle and has no more role
for the excess demand to play. That is, replace eq.(7) with the rule,
pt+1 = pt − µa Am,t+1 (10)
(µa a positive coeﬃcient, of course). It is then easily checked that this equa-
tion gives rise to (8). In fact, since the change in the market maker’s po-
sition Am,t+1 − Am,t is equal to −dt, we have pt+1 − pt = −µa Am,t+1 =









the latter two equalities from (6) and (9). Hence eq.(10) becomes






which coincides with (8) if Ad
h,t+1 is identiﬁed with zh,t. It follows that models
working with the price adjustment rule (8) can maintain the conception of
3The approach with position-based (as opposed to order-based) strategies has been
advanced by Doyne Farmer, although he is not interested in explicit optimization foun-
dations for Ad
h,t+1; see, in particular, Farmer and Joshi (2002). The implications of the
distinction between position-based and order-based strategies become clearer in Franke
(2007), which puts forward a position-based prototype model at the same conceptual level
as the inﬂuential order-based Beja–Goldman model.
5zh,t as the solution to the mean-variance maximization of expected wealth if
they include eq.(9) for the market maker’s position in their framework and
reinterpret (8) in terms of (10).
Incidentally, since all agents can realize their desired positions, Ah,t+1 =
Ad
h,t+1, it is now also seen that the excess demand rule (7) can be rewritten
as
pt+1 = pt − µd (Am,t+1 − Am,t) (12)
Here it is not a negative position that prompts the market maker to encourage
selling by raising the price, but a negative change in his position. From this
point of view eq.(11) could be defended by arguing that the market maker,
plausibly, gives priority to the level eﬀect rather than to the momentum eﬀect
in (12). On the other hand, the stylized price adjustments in (7) may be said
to be closer to more realistic trading protocols like a batch auction or an
order book mechanism. Nevertheless, it is not this note’s concern to stand
up for one of these price adjustment rules but to ask for greater conceptual
clarity in the literature employing them. Which of the two rules (7) or (10)
is actually employed in a small-scale model may then be mainly a matter of
convenience and analytical tractability.4
5. Conclusion
The present note discussed asset pricing models that combine a market maker
and the speculative agents’ mean-variance optimization of expected wealth,
the focal point being that the authors are often somewhat careless in their
reference to what they call ‘demand’ in the price adjustment rule. It was
4Indeed, once the distinction between the level and momentum eﬀect in the market
maker’s price adjustments has been made, a combination of the two principles suggests
itself. As remarked above, this option has been put forward by Farmer (2001). Franke
(2007) adopts his rule in a setting with position-based strategies, and Franke and Asada
(2008) in an otherwise Beja–Goldman setting where the speculative agents’ strategies are
oder-based (and the formulation of their market orders is complemented by a similar idea).
Because of their prototype nature, the deterministic continuous-time versions of the latter
two models are still mathematically tractable. Here we would like to put special emphasis
on a complementarity result in the stochastic simulations in Franke (2007), which with
Ad
h,t+1 = zh,t is closest to the present framework: In a cyclical scenario it was found that
neither of the two price adjustment principles should be given too much weight if the
variability of positions as well as the price is to be kept within bounds.
6clariﬁed that the solution to the optimization problem is the desired holding
of the asset, whereas the excess demand directed to the market maker will
reasonably be the desired change in the asset. Although there is no need to
respecify these models, for an appropriate interpretation of demand and price
adjustments one is faced with the following alternative: either the present
optimization story for the demand term is dropped or, maintaining it, the
market maker is assumed to adjust prices (not proportionately to excess
demand but) inversely to his accumulated inventory.
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